For a brief moment, in the euphoria of victory, the Allies had lifted a tiny corner of the veil of secrecy con­cerning German miracle weapons, only to let it fall again a little later, when the Cold War against the Soviet Union began. Suddenly, people realised that what had been found in Germany represented a considerable strategic advant­age over the Russians. As a result, the subject came under the rubric of national security, and was taboo regarding any further disclosures.

If there was such a far-advanced programme of atomic weapons research in the Third Reich, logically there must also have been locations, personnel and all the unusual things that go along with them. In fact, that was the case. There were indications of all those. To date, it is unclear which procedures were used by German physicists in their attempts to obtain the basic material for making the atomic bomb. However, it appears it must have been a simpler procedure than that used by the Americans. Within the Manhattan project vast quantities of per­sonnel, money and time were used. Moreover, it is clear that what the German nuclear physicists repeatedly presented to the public could only have been the tip of the iceberg.

Significantly, there were many German-speaking nuclear experts, among whom some must have been con­siderably more successful than only those who were named. In that connection, something known to few, is that during the 1950s Peron, the Argentinian head of state, wanted, by means of such a project, to provide the econ­omy of his country with atomic energy and thus make it competitive. It is said that he employed 2,000 German-speaking nuclear experts. That is not the only extraordinary fact.

Another question is why the German Luftwaffe, to­wards the end of the war, was making feverish efforts to revive the project for the long-range 'America bomber'. Amazingly, that was done in the face of Allied air supre­macy, and the continuing bombardment of German cities by Anglo-American aircraft. However, Goring thought it a possibility and also viewed it as a propaganda plus.

It is precisely that question which the author, Friedrich Georg, pursues in this book.

The miracle weapons' carriers of the Luftwaffe can be ivided into two different groups. One group involved modifications of existing conventional aircraft types, while the other represented aircraft with futuristic technology. It was a considerable fault on the part of the German armaments programme not to have completed the development of the Me 264 'America bomber'. It had already been flying since the end of 1942. From July 1944, then the aircraft was needed, there was only one protoype of the type, and it had not even been fully tested. From that group of conversions the Heinkel He 177 'nuclear bomber version' is the best known, having been mentioned in aviation reference works.

The atomic Heinkel He 177 would most probably have been deployed on individual missions against Allied capials in Europe. Alternatively, a kamikaze-type one-way flight over the Atlantic to New York would also have been possible. The conventionally powered He 177, very fast for its day, could have made things very difficult for the Allied
interceptor fighters. But despite all its modifications it could still have been at risk from the fast British DH 'Mosquito' night-fighter. A normal daylight raid in the West with that aircraft type would have been impossible because of Allied air superiority.